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Towards a Recognition and Dialogue 
Secularism in Europe1 
Jean-Paul Willaime* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Europe, there are various forms of secular recognition of 
religions, which combine mutual independence of the state and 
religion (secularism) and an explicit consideration of the place and 
role of religions within society (recognition). Exploring the features 
of religion-state relations in several European countries will allow us 
to both better identify each country’s own logic and avoid the risk of 
analysing them through the prism of French secularism. In doing so, 
the latter, recognition, will probably appear in its singularity since 
European schemes combine both orientations, “secularism” and 
“recognition,” which, from the French point of view, appear not to 
be easily compatible. 
Though Europe has a history of violence associated with religion 
or its negation,2 it also has a history of the pacification of religious 
and anti-religious violence.3 In other words, there is a history of the 
emergence of democratic societies who respected freedom of 
conscience and thought and who gradually built religious pluralism. 
This historical construction of peace and civil tolerance allows 
countries to organize themselves as political communities while 
recognizing that the plurality of religious and philosophical choices 
 
* Director of Studies at the Practical School of Higher Studies [Ecole Pratique des Hautes 
Etudes], Sorbonne, Paris, Group Societies, Religions, Secularisms; jean-
paul.willaime@gsrl.cnrs.fr. 
 1. A French version of this paper is published as follows: Jean-Paul Willaime, La 
prédominance européenne d’une laïcité de reconnaissance des religions, RECONFIGURATIONS ET 
NOUVEAUX DÉFIS 101–22 (Jean Baubérot, Micheline Milot, & Philippe Portier eds., Paris, 
Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2014). We thank the Publishing House of 
Human Sciences [Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme] for authorizing this 
publication in English.  
 2. See generally, Caroline Ford, Violence and the Sacred in Nineteenth-Century France, 
21 FRENCH HISTORICAL STUD. 101 (1998) (which discusses the sixteenth-century religious 
wars and their effect on France and Europe). 
 3. See generally, Mario Turchetti, Religious Concord and Political Tolerance in 
Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France, 22 SIXTEENTH CENTURY J. 15 (1991). 
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of their people was neither built in a day nor without conflict. In 
several European countries, this historic process is not very old: for 
example, the democratic transitions of the former communist bloc 
countries, or Spain and Portugal.4 Autonomy of politics and law 
from religion was an essential element of these developments.5 For 
each country, the philosophical, political, and religious genealogy of 
this process can be established. For some, this evolution was 
essentially made against religion in general or against a particular 
religion; others emphasized the contributions of the religions 
themselves to these changes.6 Be that as it may, thanks to the 
secularization of politics, religious renunciation of political power 
and political renunciation of spiritual power became essential features 
of democracy in Europe.7 Because political power has learned to 
renounce spiritual power and religious power has learned (and 
continues to learn every day) to give way to temporal power, a 
recognition of and dialogue about secularism in Europe is possible 
today. This new sharing of power creates tension and conflict that is 
not only normal, but essential. Indeed, an absence of tension and 
conflict would cause an imbalance in favour of either a religious view 
or, conversely, a secularist view of man and the world. It is a hallmark 
of democracies to leave these differences to express themselves.8 
The institutionalization and practices of various forms of secular 
recognition do not eliminate any conflicting dynamic either between 
the various religious and philosophical convictions, or between 
religious normativity and secular normativity.9 Many national 
identities in Europe have been and remain marked by religious 
dimensions; this is particularly clear in countries where a large 
majority of the population identifies with a religious tradition that is 
related to the affirmation of national sentiment (e.g. the Orthodox 
 
 4. See generally PORTUGAL: A COUNTRY STUDY (Eric Solsten ed., 1993). 
 5. See, e.g., Javier Martinez-Torron, Religious Freedom and Democratic Change in 
Spain, 2006 BYU L. REV. 777, 784 (2006). 
 6. Id. at 783. 
 7. RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 64 (Gabriel Motzkin & 
Yochi Fischer eds., 2008). 
 8. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). 
 9. For example, see RELIGIOUS AND GENDER NORMS: CHANGES, RESISTANCE, AND 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY RECONFIGURATIONS [NORMES RELIGIEUSES ET GENRE: 
MUTATIONS, RÉSISTANCES ET RECONFIGURATIONS XIXE-XXIE SIÈCLE] (Florence Rochefort 
& Maria Eleonora Sanna eds., 2013) for issues relating to gender. 
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Greece, the Lutheran Denmark, and the Catholic Ireland).10 Even if, 
in each national society, there is a real religious and philosophical 
pluralisation of people and acceptance of the convictional options at 
the individual level, the national and European levels themselves are 
less secularized than we might think. This lack of secularization was 
recently demonstrated in the Swiss vote on minarets in 200911 as well 
as the Lautsi case concerning the presence of crucifixes in classrooms 
in Italy in 2011.12 
The state-religion relations, as they were historically constructed 
in each country, have become significant elements of each state’s 
national identity. The way the states related to their gods, or rather 
those who claim to represent them, became an essential part of their 
political identity.13 Of course we think of France as a prototypical 
secularist country,14 but we also think of the United Kingdom and its 
two established churches (the Anglican Church in England and the 
Presbyterian Church in Scotland),15 Germany with its separation of 
church and state that incorporates partnering relationships between 
churches and public authorities,16 and Poland with its exodus from 
the communist bloc.17 The political and religious stories of every 
European country, and the very ways each of these stories has 
interfered in the processes of state-building and nation-building, are 
national peculiarities that establish the various forms of religion-state 
 
 10. Predominant Religions, ADHERENTS.COM, http://www.adherents.com/
adh_predom.html (last visited July 30, 2015). 
 11. See Nick Cumming-Bruce & Steven Erlanger, Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on 
Mosques, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
11/30/world/europe/30swiss.html?_r=0. 
 12. Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, App. No. 30814/06 (2011); see also 
Grégor Puppinck, The Case of Lautsi v. Italy: A Synthesis, 2012 BYU L. REV. 873, 875 (2012).  
 13. Rogers Brubaker, Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches, NATIONS AND 
NATIONALISM 2, 6 (2012); see generally Zachary D. Smith, Commandments, Crosses, & 
Prayers: The Roberts Court’s Approach to Public Religion, 2015 BYU L. REV. 845, 846 (arguing 
that the current U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to public religion helps build a 
national identity). 
 14. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.) [hereinafter FRENCH CONSTITUTION]. 
 15.  Foster Parent Ban: ‘This is a Secular State’, say High Court Judges, THE TELEGRAPH, 
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8353527/Foster-parent-ban-
this-is-a-secular-state-say-High-Court-judges.html. 
 16. Religious Freedom in Germany, BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE AND 
WORLD AFFAIRS, http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/religious-freedom-in-germany 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2015). 
 17. Karol H. Borowski, The Sociology of Religion in Modern Poland: A Critical Review, 
46 SOC. ANALYSIS 389, 391 (1985). 
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relationships. This is particularly true in countries where national 
identity is closely linked to a religion, and in the formally 
denominational states. This is the case in Greece—whose 
Constitution of 1975 was enacted “in the name of the Holy and 
Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity”;18 Bulgaria—whose Eastern 
Orthodox Religion is recognized as the “traditional religion of the 
Republic”;19 Denmark—where, according to the Constitution of 
1953, “[t]he Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the Established 
Church of Denmark, and as such shall be supported by the State,” 
and where “the King shall be a member of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church”;20 and Malta—whose Constitution of 1964 states that 
“[t]he religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion” 
and that “the authorities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church 
have the duty and the right to teach which principles are right and 
which are wrong.”21 
II. “LAÏCITÉ”: A MATTER MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE WORD 
This Part starts by addressing the different approaches between 
Catholic and Protestant countries as seen in the term Laïcité. It then 
describes how both these religious separationist and partnership 
countries have started to move closer to one another in a regime of 
separation-recognition. Finally, it finishes by discussing the two 
different types of secularism, the implications of those differences, 
and the ability of any country to adopt the more religiously accepted 
version of secularism. 
Laïcité, as a movement for emancipation of public institutions 
and people from any religious influence, appears to be a more 
operative concept in Catholic countries than in countries marked by 
Protestantism.22 This is not surprising since the term “laïcité” itself is 
found more often in Latin languages (i.e. Catholic countries) than in 
Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, and Scandinavian languages (i.e. Protestant, 
Orthodox, or bi-denominational countries). “Laïcité” appears as an 
emancipation movement in comparison to the former influence of 
the Catholic Church in and on some national societies. Comparing 
 
 18. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] (Greece) (amended 2001). 
 19. 1991 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, art. 14. 
 20. 1953 CONSTITUTIONAL ACT OF DENMARK, §§ 4, 6. 
 21. 1964 CONSTITUTION OF MALTA, art. 2, §§ 1−2. 
 22. David A. Martin, Religion and Public Values: A Catholic-Protestant Contrast, 26 
REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 313, 327 (1985). 
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France and Germany, the philosopher Jean-Marc Ferry noted that 
“the secularization of French society is not the secularization of 
German society. These are two different ways of political 
neutralization of religions: the Catholic or post-Catholic way is 
carried out in the mode of separation, while the Protestant way 
proceeds by internalizing or absorbing originally religious 
elements.”23 The Enlightenment was modulated differently in 
different countries and has not maintained the same relationship to 
religious matter.24 While aiming at the emancipation of individuals 
and the achievement of a just society, the emphasis, specifies Jean-
Marc Ferry, has not been placed on the same levers of 
development.25 “In practice, the French Enlightenment would rather 
emphasize the importance of the state and politics; the Scottish 
Enlightenment, the market and civil society; the Prussian 
Enlightenment, the University and culture.”26 In other words, all 
European countries did not enter political agnosticism in the same 
way or for the same reasons.27 
After opposing both the denominational model that prevailed in 
countries with a protestant and orthodox culture and the separation 
models that prevailed in predominantly Catholic countries of 
Europe, Philippe Portier described a crossover movement: 
“Denominational states have opened to the separatist logic, separatist 
states to the partnership logic. Hence, we have seen a shared model 
of secularism emerge in Europe, which meets the criteria of both 
equality and recognition of memberships, specific to the regime of 
flexible separation.”28 Indeed, a regime of separation-recognition 
prevails in Europe, a regime which, while based on the respective 
autonomy of the state and religions, explicitly recognizes the place 
and role of religious groups by giving them a specific 
legal framework.29 
 
 23. Jean-Marc Ferry, Les Lumières: un projet contemporain? [The Enlightenment: a 
contemporary project?], ESPRIT [SPIRIT], Aug.–Sept. 2009, at 164 (Fr.). 
 24. Id. at 163–64. 
 25. Id. at 164. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Philippe Portier, États et Églises en Europe: Vers un modèle commun de laïcité? [States 
and Churches in Europe: Towards a common model of secularism], 393 FUTURIBLES 89, 
91 (2013). 
 28. Id. at 98. 
 29. James Q. Whitman, Separating Church and State: The Atlantic Divide, 34 HIST. 
REFLECTIONS 86, 95 (2008). 
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However, before showing how this separation-recognition is 
expressed in the various European countries, it is necessary to clarify 
what is meant by secularism. There are two dimensions of secularism: 
1) a general principle for state-religion relationships in pluralist 
democracies that respect the freedom of conscience, thought, and 
religion and all that is implied by such freedom (secularity); and 2) a 
philosophical, free-thinking, and agnostic concept that promotes a 
secular vision of man and the world as an alternative to religious 
concepts (secularism).30 How states define secularism impacts their 
acceptance of the term as applied to their own national identity. In 
Belgium, for example, secularism is recognized as the concept of 
being free-thinking, comparable to various religions.31 The 
sociologist Jean Rémy was keen on emphasizing that the Belgian 
State is pluralistic and non-secular.32 In some respects, however, 
Belgium is more secular than France, which sometimes allows itself 
to be penetrated more by a philosophical secularism as a criticism of 
religion than by a genuine secular neutrality.33 As emphasized in the 
Strasbourg Consortium, the distinction between secularity and 
secularism is fundamental: 
There is an important, perhaps critical, distinction between 
secularity and secularism: One concept is a fundamental component 
of liberal pluralism and a bastion against religious extremism, and 
the other is a misguided, even dangerous, ideology that may 
degenerate into its own dystopian fundamentalism. Secularity is an 
approach to religion-state relations that avoids identification of the 
state with any particular religion or ideology (including secularism 
itself) and that endeavors to provide a neutral framework capable of 
 
 30. José Casanova, The Secular and Secularisms, 4 SOC. RESEARCH 1049, 1050–51 
(2009); see also Iain McLean, Secularity and Secularism in the United Kingdom: On the Way to 
the First Amendment, 2011 BYU L. REV. 637 (2011). 
 31. Jean-Paul Willaime, Les laïcités belge et française au défi de la laïcité européenne 
[Belgian and French Secularisms Challenge European Secularism], in POLITIQUE ET RELIGION 
EN FRANCE ET EN BELGIQUE [POLITICS AND RELIGION IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM] 161–77 
(François Foret ed., 2009); see also Jean-Paul Willaime, Religious and Philosophical Diversity as 
a Challenge for the Secularism: A Belgian-French Comparison, in RELIGIOUS PLURALISM: 
FRAMING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 63–72 (Giuseppe Giordan 
& Enzo Pace eds., 2014). 
 32. Christian Maroy, Jean Remy & Luc Van Campenhoudt, Faith and the Craft: 
Symbolic Transactions in Christian Institutions [La Foi et Le Métier: Transactions Symboliques 
Dans Les Institutions Chrétiennes], 100 INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGY PAPERS [100 CAHIERS 
INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE] 91, 92 (1996). 
 33.  Id. 
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accommodating a broad range of religions and beliefs. Secularism, 
in contrast, is an ideological position that is committed to 
promoting a secular order.34 
In other words, secularism is not the secularist state. The secular 
state, in democratic societies, is a neutral and impartial state 
regarding the religions and beliefs of its nationals; in other words, a 
state which, when functioning as a state, does professes neither a 
particular religion nor any atheistic philosophy of life. This secular 
state, which also involves the secular character of public institutions 
and services (and their agents), does not mean that the society itself 
is secular. The people who comprise the populous may have very 
diversified religious affiliations or none at all, and the states may 
consider this component of civil societies by integrating their 
contributions to public life. Whether the word “secularism” is 
employed or not, this principled secularism (corresponding to 
English “secularity” and the notion of the secular state) is based on 
the following three elements: 
1) Freedom of conscience, thought, and religion, which 
includes the freedom to have or to not have a religion, 
the freedom to change religion, and the freedom to 
practice or to not practice the religion of one’s choice 
(within the limits of law, democracy, and human rights); 
2) Equality of rights and duties of all citizens regardless of 
their religious or philosophical identifications, i.e., non-
discrimination of persons by the State and public 
authorities based on their religious or 
philosophical affiliations; 
3) The respective autonomy of the State and religions, which 
means both the freedom of the State in relation to 
religions and the freedom of religions in relation to the 
State (while complying with the laws and principles of 
human rights within a democracy).35 
 
 34. Secularism vs. Secularity in Europe, STRASBOURG CONSORTIUM, 
http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/?blurbId=379&table=blurb_fa&pageId=9 (last visited 
June 15, 2015); see also Neville Rochow, An Incurable Malaise: Commonwealth v. Australian 
Capital Territory and Baskin v. Bogan as Symptoms of Early-Onset Dystopia, 2015 BYU L. REV. 
609 (2015). 
 35. Id. 
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In Europe, compliance with this principled secularism does not 
appear incompatible with various forms of recognition of religions.36 
This is why support for the idea of “secularism of recognition,” even 
if this expression may mirror church-state separation in France, 
resonates strangely in French secular ears. Indeed, in France, 
interference was very prevalent between secularism as a principle of 
regulating pluralism by a neutral state and as a critical view of 
religion. In fact, the tradition of an emancipatory state exercising a 
sort of philosophical magisterium on the population weighed in 
relation with the religious was often more prevalent, as the “true” 
freedom was only to be found in the emancipation against 
religions.37 Thus, as soon as public recognition is manifest with 
regard to a religious matter, it quickly gives rise to reactions from 
those who confuse secularism and privatization of religious matters. 
Despite the weight of this tradition and its reactionary response to 
Islam, developments have nevertheless taken place.38 Philippe 
Portier, in a contribution in which he distinguishes different variants 
of “recognition plans” (“restricted,” “positive,” and “negative”),39 
observes that, had France started from a negative recognition 
regime, it would have evolved towards a recognition and dialogue 
secularism.40 Having developed this thesis in 2005 myself,41 I note 
today that the trend predicted then is confirmed now, especially in 
 
 36. Whitman, supra note 29. 
 37. Jean-Paul Willaime, The Paradoxes of Laïcité in France, in THE CENTRALITY OF 
RELIGION IN SOCIAL LIFE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAMES A. BECKFORD 41–54 (Eileen Barker 
ed., 2008). 
 38. Id. at 47–49. 
 39. Philippe Portier, Introduction : The religious essence of political modernity. Elements 
for a renewal of secularism theory [Introduction: L’essence religieuse de la modernité politique. 
Éléments pour un renouvellement de la théorie de la laïcité], in MODERNITY AGAINST 
RELIGION? A NEW APPROACH TO SECULARISM [LA MODERNITÉ CONTRE LA RELIGION? POUR 
UNE NOUVELLE APPROCHE DE LA LAÏCITÉ] 7, 17 (Jacqueline Lagrée & Philippe Portier 
eds., 2010). 
 40. Philippe Portier, Conclusion: “Plural Modernities?” A longitudinal approach to 
national regulatory models of belief in Western democracies [Conclusion: “Modernités plurielles?” 
Une approche longitudinale des modèles nationaux de régulation du croire dans les démocraties 
occidentales], in RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND CITIZENSHIP [PLURALISME RELIGIEUX ET 
CITOYENNETÉ] 255–56 (Micheline Milot, Philippe Portier & Jean-Paul Willaime eds., 2010).  
 41. See Jean-Paul Willaime, 1905 et la pratique d’une laïcité de reconnaissance sociale des 
religions [1905 and the Practice of a Secularism of Social Recognition of Religions], 129 
ARCHIVES DE SCIENCES SOCIALES DES RELIGIONS [ARCHIVES OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF 
RELIGIONS] 67 (2005). 
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certain areas of public action,42 even if there are some secularist 
tensions facing Islam.43 The next Part will develop this idea of 
“recognition secularism” and then demonstrate its prevalence 
throughout many major Western and Eastern European countries. 
III. THE EUROPEAN PREVALENCE OF A RECOGNITION 
SECULARISM 
Focusing on Europe allows specificity and refinement of the 
concept of recognition secularism by 1) providing additional 
elements of empirical validation and 2) showing how this is a suitable 
phrase to describe the reality of religion-state relations as can be 
observed in most European countries (although, as mentioned 
previously,44 a few countries are still denominational states). As used 
in this Paper, the term recognition secularism refers to the social 
recognition of religious communities. This recognition is certainly 
reflected in legal terms by specific legal frameworks available to 
religious groups, but it is the aspect of social recognition that I would 
especially like to emphasize. Legal recognition is only the translation, 
at the legal level, of a socio-cultural consideration of religions and 
their contributions to community life. There is a social recognition 
of religions as specific social and cultural realities—associative 
groups. Particular associative groups generate specific modes of 
consideration, including within the legal framework extant in each 
country. States recognize religions across five dimensions: 
1) a strictly legal dimension when providing specific legal 
frameworks to carry out religious activities;45 
 
 42. This is especially true in the prison and military chaplaincies. With regard to the 
first, the research carried out by Celine Beraud, Claire de Galembert and Corinne Rostaing 
discusses the consideration of the social utility of religion inside the prison environment in 
terms of “the religion that appeases.” Religious connections offer opportunities for a spiritual 
escape from the rigors of confinement. Céline Béraud, De Galembert Claire & Corinne 
Rostaing, GODS AND MEN IN PRISON [DES HOMMES ET DES DIEUX EN PRISON] (2013). The 
authors characterize the prison secularism as recognition secularity. Id. at 34.  
 43. Id. at 166. 
 44. See supra text accompanying note 18–21. 
 45. Jean-Paul Williame, La sécularisation: Une exception européenne? Retour sur un 
concept et sa discussion en sociologie des religions [Secularization: A European Exception? 
Returning to a concept and its discussion in sociology of religions], 47 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE 
SOCIOLOGIE [FRENCH REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY] 755, 761 (2006). In France, this is true even 
for religious associations and congregations.  
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2) a strictly social dimension when taking into account religious 
contributions in the areas of social solidarity and education;46 
3) an ethical dimension when consulting on issues involving 
conceptions of the human person;47 
4) a more political dimension when States provide for partnership 
and cooperation with religious groups to work towards 
common goals;48 and 
5) a more symbolic dimension when States mobilize religions, often 
the majority religion, to celebrate the national communion on 
particular occasions (e.g., deaths, disasters, etc.).49 
Consider how that recognition has taken shape in several countries, 
including those that have recently adopted new state-religion 
relationships either by abolishing a non-separation scheme,50 or, for 
the countries of the former communist bloc, creating a new scheme 
within the construction of a democratic system.51 The fact that these 
various forms of recognition secularism are recent creations in several 
countries shows that it is not a scenario resulting from potentially 
obsolete historical and traditional legacies. No, these recently 
established religion-state relationships are considered appropriate 
arrangements for relations with religions in democratic societies that 
respect human rights.52 
Before analyzing four countries of the former communist bloc, 
let us examine seven countries in Western Europe and their 
relationship with religion: three predominantly Lutheran Protestant 
(Sweden, Norway, and Germany) and four predominately Catholic 
(Portugal, Spain, Belgium, and Austria). 
Sweden and Norway53 chose a separation-recognition scheme, far 
from a separation “the French way.”54 In Sweden, after having 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., BOLIVIA’S CONSTITUTION OF 2009. 
 51. Borowski, supra note 17, at 391. 
 52. The information reported on each country is taken from the records of the Eurel 
website (sociological and legal data on religion in Europe) and is available at the following 
address: www.eurel.info. We also used the Spain leaflet in the Observatory Pharos data bank on 
pluralism of cultures and religions: http://www.observatoirepharos.com/. 
 53. Norway recently introduced a state-religion separation, Church of Norway – A Brief 
History, CHURCH OF NORWAY (Feb. 16, 2015), https://kirken.no/nb-NO/church-of-
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introduced a separation between the Lutheran Church and the State 
in 2000,55 religious communities can register and have the 
acknowledged right to use the state tax system to collect 
membership fees.56 State aid is provided for religious communities 
who “contribute to maintaining and strengthening the fundamental 
values upon which society is based” and demonstrate stability.57 In 
Norway, on May 21, 2012, the Parliament almost unanimously 
approved a Constitutional amendment that made the Norwegian 
Lutheran Church more independent.58 It is remarkable to observe 
two facts which show that here, too, the separation is far from 
“French”: 1) the Norwegian Constitution stressed the fact that the 
country’s “values will remain [their] Christian and humanist 
heritage”;59 2) the Norwegian Lutheran Church, to which the royal 
family will have to continue to belong,60 was in favour of 
separation.61 The Church will continue to collect public funds along 
with other religious groups.62 
On the other hand, Portugal and Spain, two countries of the 
Iberian Peninsula, redesigned their religion-state relationship 
following the end of dictatorial regimes and the consecutive building 
of their democracies.63 The Portuguese law on religious freedom 
from June 22, 2001 explicitly defines two principles: separation and 
cooperation.64 The Portuguese government must work with the 
churches and religious communities rooted in Portugal, given their 
representativeness, in particular to promote human rights, contribute 
 
norway/about/brief-history/; Swedes End Long Union of Church and State, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 
31, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/31/world/swedes-end-long-union-of-
church-and-state.html. 
 54. FRENCH CONSTITUTION, supra note 14. 
 55. Carol J. Williams, Sweden Ends Designation of Lutheranism as Official Religion, L.A. 
TIMES, (Jan. 1, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2000/jan/01/   local/me-49706. 
 56. Act on Religious Communities, SFS 1998:1593, Section 16, as amended (Swed.). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Church of Norway – A Brief History, supra note 53. 
 59. Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway (May 17, 1814), art. 2, available at 
https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/constitutionenglish.pdf. 
 60. Id. at art. 4. 
 61. Associated Press, Church-state split is sought in Norway, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 9 
2006, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/650213367/Church-state-split-is-sought-in-
Norway.html?pg=all. 
 62. Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway, supra note 59 at art. 16. 
 63. PORTUGAL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 4. 
 64. 2001 Religious Freedom Act (Port.). 
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to the overall development of each individual and to promote the 
values of “peace, freedom, solidarity, and tolerance.”65 This idea of 
separation-recognition enables religious groups to fulfil the criteria 
of explicitly cooperating with the state in the promotion and 
development of the core values of democracy. The state, in turn, 
agrees to take into account the contributions of religions to its 
objectives of common interest.66 
In Spain, the Constitution of December 27, 1978 put an end to 
the denominational status of the State.67 But, while proclaiming, 
“there shall be no State religion,”68 the Constitution adds: “The 
public authorities shall take the religious beliefs of Spanish society 
into account and shall consequently maintain appropriate 
cooperation with the Catholic Church and the other confessions.”69 
The law on religious freedom of July 5, 1980 in turn indicates in 
article 17: “The State, taking account of the religious beliefs of 
Spanish society, will establish, if necessary, agreements or 
cooperation conventions with the registered Churches, 
denominations, and religious communities which, by their 
importance and number of believers have reached a notable 
rootedness in Spain.”70 In fact, in addition to the Concordat 
negotiated with the Catholic Church from 1976 to 1979, the 
Spanish government signed agreements with three religious groups 
having a “notable rootedness” in Spain in 1992: Jews, Muslims, and 
Protestants.71 These agreements provide these groups with some 
“advantages,” including civil recognition of the marriages they 
celebrate and the teaching of their religion in public schools.72 Even 
if the subject remains highly confrontational in Spain, especially on 
the issue of religious education in schools,73 this State practices its 
own form of a religious recognition type of secularism. 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) [hereinafter SPAIN CONSTITUTION]. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. B.O.E. 1980, 177 (Spain). 
 71. U.S. STATE DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: SPAIN (2013). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Mar Griera, Les débats concernant l’enseignement des religions à l’école en Espagne 
[The Debates on the Teaching of Religions in School in Spain], in LE DÉFI DE L’ENSEIGNEMENT 
DES FAITS RELIGIEUX À L’ÉCOLE: RÉPONSES EUROPÉENNES ET QUÉBÉCOISES [THE 
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Belgium is a country where seven religious groups are 
recognized by the State: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Anglican, 
Jewish, Muslim, plus a seventh non-denominational philosophical 
community.74 In contrast to the French State which neither 
recognizes nor employs any religion,75 the Belgian State not only 
recognizes different religions, but also subsidizes them.76 Rik Torfs, 
of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, notes that the Belgian system 
establishes a clear distinction between the State and religion and 
dedicates their mutual independence.77 He indicates that the Belgian 
State applies an active neutrality regarding religions by recognizing 
certain religions and financing them.78 While opening a university 
symposium in Ghent in 2010, the Flemish Minister, Geert 
Bourgeois, stated that neutrality does not mean that public 
authorities cannot maintain relations with religious or philosophical 
organizations. It does not object to aid to churches and religious and 
philosophical institutions, nor social activities subsidies of Churches 
and religious or philosophical organizations.79 Since June 21, 2002, 
the Belgian State recognizes and finances the “non-denominational 
philosophical communities” in addition to the six recognized 
religions.80 In Belgium, the philosophies of this group are referred to 
by the term “organized secularism.”81 As a result of this law, the 
 
CHALLENGE OF TEACHING RELIGIOUS FACTS IN SCHOOL: EUROPEAN AND QUÉBÉCOISES 
RESPONSES] 145–70 (Jean-Paul Willaime ed., 2014). 
 74. U.S. STATE DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: 
BELGIUM (2013). 
 75. FRENCH CONSTITUTION supra note 14. 
 76. U.S. STATE DEP’T: BELGIUM, supra note 74. 
 77. Rik Torfs, Église, État et laïcité en Belgique: Remarques introductives [Church, State, 
and Secularism in Belgium: Introductory remarks], in LE FINANCEMENT DES CULTES ET DE LA 
LAÏCITÉ: COMPARAISON INTERNATIONALE ET PERSPECTIVES [FINANCING RELIGIONS AND 
SECULARISM: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON AND PERSPECTIVES] 16–17 (Jean-François 
Husson ed., 2005). 
 78. Id. at 17. 
 79. Geert Bourgeois, Toespraak bij Europees Congres “Dialoog en overleg tussen de 
levensbeschouwingen/religies en de publieke overheden in Europa. Uitdagingen en grenzen 
van nieuwe bestursvormen” [Speech to the European Conference “Dialogue and Reflections 
between the Religions/Worldviews and the Public Authorities. Challenges and Limits of the 
New Management”] (Mar. 9 2010) (transcript available at http://www.geertbourgeois.be/   
toespraken/toespraak-9-maart-2010-europees-congres-%E2%80%9Cdialoog-en-overleg-
tussen-de-levensbeschouwingen). 
 80. 1994 CONST. art. 181 (Belg.). 
 81. Claude Javeau, La laïcité ecclésialisée: le cas de la Belgique [Ecclesiastical Secularism: 
The case of Belgium], in DES MAÎTRES ET DES DIEUX: ÉCOLES ET RELIGIONS EN EUROPE 
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sociologist Claude Javeau noted that secularism forms the “seventh 
recognized religion” in Belgium.82 Whether in prison or in the army, 
you can as easily seek the assistance of a Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, 
or Muslim chaplain as the assistance of a “humanist” chaplain (i.e., 
layman/secular).83 The Belgian example illustrates that practicing an 
active neutrality concerning religions and beliefs can be manifest in 
public funding and supportive religious activities, funding that is not 
incompatible with state neutrality for religious and philosophical 
concepts of existence. 
Germany and Austria take a different approach. In Germany, 
although “there is no state church,” the most important religious 
groups are recognized as corporations under public law and 
integrated as partners in the public sphere.84 Austria distinguishes 
between three levels of status: 1) religious societies recognized by 
law and having the status of a legal person in public law (there are 
thirteen); 2) other religious communities merely “recorded by the 
State”; and 3) other religious communities that are associations 
governed by the Associations Act.85 
Four countries of the former Communist bloc, Latvia, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Romania, chose various forms of separation-
recognition when establishing their democracy.86 So Latvia, while 
proclaiming that “the church shall be separate from the State,”87 and 
stating in the Law on Religious Organizations that the State will 
privilege no denomination or religion in particular,88 recognizes 
eight religious groups as “traditional churches”: Lutheran, Catholic, 
Orthodox, Old Believers, Methodists, Baptists, Seventh Day 
Adventists, and Jews.89 This status, established in 2004, allows 
agreements to be made with the state recognizing the specific role of 
the Church in the country’s legal system and the value system of 
 
[MASTERS AND GODS: SCHOOLS AND RELIGIONS IN EUROPE] 155 (Jean-Paul Willaime & 
Séverine Mathieu eds., 2005). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 155–56.  
 84. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (BASIC LAW) art. 
137, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0864. 
 85. U.S. STATE DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: 
AUSTRIA (2013). 
 86. PORTUGAL: A COUNTRY STUDY supra note 4. 
 87. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA 1922, art. 99. 
 88. See Law on Religious Organizations, 1995, amended 2002, art. 2 (Lat.).  
 89. U.S. STATE DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: LATVIA (2013). 
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society, as well as its major contribution to moral and 
socialization processes.90 
The Constitution of Poland expresses a particularly strong 
example of separation-recognition: “The relationship between the 
State and churches and other religious organizations shall be based 
on the principle of respect for their autonomy and mutual 
independence of each in its own sphere, as well as on the principle of 
cooperation for the individual and the common good.”91 This is an 
explicit recognition of the contribution of religions to shared values. 
According to Michaela Moravcikova, “the Slovak Republic 
acknowledges [the churches’] social and legal status as public and 
legal institutions sui generic, and co-operates with them according to 
the principles of partnership co-operation . . . .”92 In fact, there is a 
concordat (an agreement or treaty) with the Vatican as well as 
agreements with other religious communities.93 According to 
Michaela Moravcikova, the churches are “a significant part of 
cultural and social life of the State, and an important factor in the 
creation of a spiritual and moral consciousness in society.”94 Hence, 
the church-state relationship provides for registration of churches 
and religious communities in the Ministry of Culture of the Republic 
if they have at least 20,000 members.95 However, among the twenty 
or so churches and religious communities registered in 2007, some 
have fewer than 20,000 members because their existence prior to the 
192/1992 law on registration was taken into account.96 
In 2006, Romania adopted a law on religious freedom and the 
general status of religions.97 After asserting that “[t]he Romanian 
State observes and guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND OF 2ND APRIL 1997, art. 25, 
para. 3. 
 92. Michaela Moravcikova, Legal Status of Churches and Religious Communities, EUREL: 
SOCIOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DATA ON RELIGIONS IN EUROPE, 
http://www.eurel.info/spip.php?rubrique504&lang=en (last visited June 17, 2015). 
 93. Treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Holy See about Catholic upbringing 
and education, Holy See, Slovak Republic, May 13, 2004, no. 394/2004 Z. z (available at 
http://www.concordatwatch.eu/kb-1225.834). 
 94. Moravcikova, supra note 92. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Freedom of Religion and the General Status of Denominations (Law 
489/2006) (Rom.). 
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thought, conscience and religion for any individual on the territory 
of Romania,”98 the law states: 
(1) The Romanian State recognizes the denominations’ spiritual, 
educational, social-charitable, cultural and social partnership role, 
as well their status as factors of social peace. 
(2) The Romanian State recognizes the important role of the 
Romanian Orthodox Church and that of other churches and 
denominations as recognized by the national history of Romania 
and in the life of Romanian society.99 
While proclaiming that “[t]here is no State Religion in 
Romania”100 and that “the State is neutral toward any religious 
persuasion or atheistic ideology,”101 the Romanian state grants the 
status of recognized denominations to the religious associations 
“that, through their activities and number of worshipers, provide 
guarantees of sustainability, stability and public interest.”102 Article 
18 specifies the three criteria required to qualify for the category of 
“recognized religion”: 
1) have been operating without interruption as a religious 
organization in Romania for at least twelve years; 
2) present a list proving that at least 0.1% of the population of 
Romania is a member the organization; 
3) present the declaration of faith and bylaws for the organization 
and operation.103 
According to these standards, eighteen religious organizations 
were registered as “recognized religions” by the Romanian state in 
2006.104 In addition to the Romanian Orthodox Church (and two 
other Orthodox Churches), the Roman Catholic Church, the 
United Romanian Church, the Greco-Roman Catholic Church, nine 
Protestant churches (Reformed, two Lutheran, Baptist, Pentecostal, 
two Evangelical, Seventh-Day Adventist, and Unitarian), the 
Armenian Church, the Federation of Jewish Communities in 
 
 98. Id. at art. 1, para. 1. 
 99. Id. at art. 7. 
 100. Id. at art. 9, para. 1. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at art. 17, para. 1. 
 103. Id. at art. 18. 
 104. Id. at app. 
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Romania, the Muslim religion, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses.105 These 
churches were recognized on the understanding that the State may 
decide to “withdraw the status of recognized denomination when 
that denomination’s activity seriously threatens public safety, order, 
health, morality or the fundamental human rights and liberties”106 
that the status of being a recognized denomination allows them. 
These include the ability to: 
• cooperate “in domains of common interests” in 
partnerships with public authorities;107 
• receive, on request, state support for the 
remuneration of the clerical and secular staff “based 
on the number of their worshipers who are 
Romanian citizens and based on their genuine needs 
of subsistence and activity”;108 
• benefit from the exemption from military service for 
the clerical and monastic staff;109 
• guarantee religious education in public and 
private schools;110 
• have, within the public education system, theological 
training centres for teacher training;111 and 
• establish, at the local level, denominational  cemeteries.112 
Religious organizations that do not meet the criteria to be 
recognized as “religions” or who do not wish to benefit from this 
status, are offered two possibilities: “religious association” or 
“religious group.”113 A religious association is defined as a legal 
entity of private law composed of at least 300 people and is included 
in the “Registry of religious associations.”114 These religious 
associations also benefit from tax incentives115 and may eventually 
 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at art. 21. 
 107. Id. at art. 9. 
 108. Id. at art. 10. 
 109. Id. at art. 25. 
 110. Id. at art. 32. 
 111. Id. at art. 4. 
 112. Id. at art. 28. 
 113. Id. at art. 5 para. 2. 
 114. Id. at art. 40.  
 115. Id. at art. 44. 
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become a recognized religion.116 A religious group is a form of 
association without legal personality, in other words, a de facto 
association.117 
As can be seen in both Western and Eastern Europe, forms of 
recognition secularism have been deployed by articulating the 
reciprocal independence of the state and of religions on the one 
hand, with the explicit acknowledgement of the place and role of 
religions in the collective life on the other hand. Part IV further 
analyses the assumptions and the impact of such a posture with 
respect to the social and cultural phenomenon of religion. 
IV. A SOCIAL AND CIVIC AWARENESS OF RELIGIONS 
The features of religion-state relationships in European countries 
reject ostracism with regard to religion.118 These states consider that 
the religious dimension of these associations is not in itself an 
obstacle to their social, cultural, educational, ethical, and civic 
contributions for collective life, an awareness that may even go as far 
as providing funding to these organizations.119 This attitude includes 
both a trivialization of the religious phenomenon and an awareness 
of its specific features. On the one hand, the attitude is trivializing in 
the sense that without special attention to the religious dimension of 
these organizations, they are considered to be like other social 
organizations. Although based on a conviction of beliefs, these 
organizations are also similar to others that perform various social 
functions and whose contributions may be of interest to the state 
(like sports and arts organizations for example).120 On the other 
hand, taking into account the specific features of the religious 
phenomenon as a social and cultural fact, they are given specific legal 
frameworks in which their organization is respected insofar as the 
operation of authority and the internal implementation of their own 
standards are concerned.121 
 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at art. 1. 
 118. Religious Freedom in Germany, supra note 16. 
 119. Id. 
 120. In some respects, one might consider that this trivialization represents a 
radicalization of secularism: getting away from any scheme of criticism of religion, religions are 
approached as social and cultural facts that deploy their activities and their contributions are 
positively accepted in the rules of law, human rights, and pluralist democracy.  
 121. See supra Part III. 
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This awareness may, for example, go as far as recognizing the 
right of a religious organization to dismiss one of its employees if the 
employee, by his/her behaviour, contradicts the core values of the 
group in which he/she freely chooses to work. In the Obst v. 
Germany case concerning an official of The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints (Mormon church) who was summarily dismissed 
by the authorities of the church for adultery, the European Court of 
Human Rights did not find that there had been an abuse of power 
by the authorities of the church because of the importance of the 
principle of marital fidelity to the church.122 The employment 
contract implies respect for the group’s “high moral principles.”123 
On July 9, 2013, this same Court validated the refusal of the 
Romanian Orthodox Church to register a trade union of employees, 
considering that not doing so would have come back to an 
illegitimate interference in the internal organization of a religious 
group.124 Taking into account the specific features of religious groups 
is also manifest in the fact that public authorities explicitly integrate 
their contributions in the field of education, particularly with regard 
to moral education, and in the field of ethics at the level of society as 
a whole.125 In doing so, states recognize religious groups as providers 
of guidance and as resources in the conduct of life and the search for 
a good life. 
These regimes of recognition secularism ultimately reflect a 
sociological understanding of religious phenomena by demonstrating 
a deep understanding, though often implicit, of these religious 
issues. Indeed, these devices show that public authorities have 
generally understood that religious phenomena should not be 
reduced either to their private and individual dimensions, or to their 
dimensions of beliefs and ritual practices. The public authorities have 
both implicitly and explicitly incorporated the notion that religious 
associations are not like other associations into their laws and 
policies.126 They recognize that these are associations that deeply 
 
 122. Obst v. Germany, App. No. 425/03, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 688, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-100463. 
 123. Id. at ¶ 50. 
 124. Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, App. No. 2330/09, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
688, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122763#{“itemid”:[“001-122763”]}. 
 125.  Liam Gearon, European Religious Education and European Civil Religion, 60 
BRITISH J. EDUC. STUD. 151, 152 (2012). 
 126. Moravcikova, supra note 92. 
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mobilize people, involving emotional and militant dimensions and 
creating sustainable identities, in constant evolution beyond the 
variety and intensity level of practices and beliefs to each other.127 
These associations constitute, for the persons who adhere to them, 
identity and ethical resources; they articulate the individual and the 
collective, the local and the global.128 Above all, they provide “sense” 
in the three meanings of the word: the meaning of life and death, 
happiness and unhappiness; the direction of life by ethical standards 
that guide behaviour; and sensations, or ways of feeling individually 
and collectively, the individual and collective emotions.129 Therefore, 
it is indeed a matter of social realities sui generis, even if from one era 
to another, from one culture to another; these realities are changing 
and take many different forms. Religious phenomena are symbolic 
infrastructure through which human beings attempt to symbolically 
master their existence, to be part of space and time, in a synchrony 
and a diachrony.130 It is, therefore, a social and cultural phenomenon 
that requires the implementation of a symbolic intelligence 
secularism in which human beings also function within the three 
above-mentioned dimensions. 
Another dimension also emerged: the recognition by public 
authorities of the historical and cultural importance that one or 
several specific religious traditions have had in a given country.131 
The particular roles of Lutheranism in Sweden, Orthodoxy in 
Romania, and Catholicism in Spain are obvious in these countries.132 
Trying to promote a sense of equality by putting all religions on the 
same level—for example, Buddhism and Catholicism in Spain133—
seems like an attempt to apply an abstract scheme that denies history 
and reality. Merely considering the individual aspects of religious and 
philosophical attitudes fails to account for the cultural strata of 
 
 127. See Borowski, supra note 17, at 390. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, Religious Beliefs, Religious Participation, and 
Cooperation, 4 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 121, 121–22 (2012). 
 130. Jean-Paul Willaime, L’approche sociologique des religions. Une réduction de son objet ou 
une compréhension objectivante de celui-ci? [The Sociological Approach of Religions. A 
Reduction of the Issue or an Objective Understanding of It?], in L’EXPÉRIENCE RELIGIEUSE. 
APPROCHES EMPIRIQUES. ENJEUX PHILOSOPHIQUES [THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: 
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES] 197–216 (Anthony Feneuil ed. 2012). 
 131. Act on Religious Communities, supra note 56. 
 132. Id.; Moravcikova, supra note 92; FRENCH CONSTITUTION, supra note 14. 
 133. FRENCH CONSTITUTION, supra note 14. 
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societies, the fact that particular religious dimensions have played a 
more significant role in the history of the societies and in their 
configuration as state-national communities. This is particularly 
identifiable in their national calendars134 and the architectural 
landscape of religious buildings.135 Because of this, offering to certain 
religious groups a legal framework recognizing specific rights and 
some protection for facilities according to certain criteria would in 
itself constitute a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR).136 This article guarantees, in addition to 
the freedom of religion and belief, the protection against 
discrimination of a religious or convictional group in comparison 
with others—in other words, equal treatment for all of them.137 It 
should be noted that any discrimination is prohibited by the ECHR 
under Article 14: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on 
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status.”138 
This does not prevent the Strasbourg Court (i.e. European 
Court of Human Rights) from considering the various recognition 
systems practiced by the states that come within the margin of 
appreciation of these states, which, given the special role of certain 
religions in the collective life of their country, grant them certain 
privileges.139 The control of the Court is exercised only in ensuring 
that the recognition system be open to any religious group that 
meets the required criteria.140 Thus, the Court held that Austria had 
 
 134. Ted Purinton & Vicki Gunther, Closing School for the Holidays – Whose Holidays?, 93 
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 33, 33 (2011). 
 135. Hewitt B. Vinnedge, Popular Church Building in Medieval France, 16 CATHOLIC 
HIST. REV. 44 (1930). 
 136. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. art. 9. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at art. 14. 
 139. See Savez Crkava v. Croatia, App. No. 7798/08, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 85; 
Religionsgemeinschaft der Zuegen Jehovas v. Austria, App. No. 40825/98, 2008 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. § 96. See also Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 96–
98; Handyside v. The United Kingdom., App. No. 5493/72, 1976 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 47–49; 
see also Vanja-Ivan Savić, Still Fighting God in the Public Arena: Does Europe Pursue the 
Separation of Religion and State Too Devoutly or Is It Saying It Does Without Really Meaning 
It?, 2015 BYU L. REV. 679 (2015) (discussing the importance and application of the “margin 
of appreciation” doctrine in Europe).  
 140. Zuegen Jehovas, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 92.  
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violated Article 9 of the Convention by multiplying the obstacles.141 
This was especially evidenced by a ten-year waiting period that 
prevented Jehovah’s Witnesses from being granted the status of 
“religious society” (Religionsgemeinschaft), the highest degree of 
recognition of a religious group in Austria, which includes the right 
to teach religion in public schools.142 In its judgement, the 
Court stated: 
In view of these substantive privileges accorded to religious 
societies, the obligation under Article 9 of the Convention 
incumbent on the State’s authorities to remain neutral in the 
exercise of their powers in this domain requires therefore that if a 
State sets up a framework for conferring legal personality on 
religious groups to which a specific status is linked, all religious 
groups which so wish must have a fair opportunity to apply for this 
status and the criteria established must be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner.143 
In a decision concerning Croatia and the applications submitted 
by several Protestant communities, the Court found that the 
Croatian state’s refusal to sign agreements with the Protestant 
communities constituted discrimination in exercising the right to 
freedom of religion; although the conclusion of special agreements 
with the state and some religious communities to establish a specific 
legal regime for them, was not in itself contrary to Articles 9 and 14 
of the Convention.144 On this occasion, the Court stated: 
The Court reiterates that discrimination means treating differently, 
without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in 
relevantly similar situations. However, the Contracting States enjoy 
a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what 
extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different 
treatment . . . . In particular, the conclusion of agreements between 
the State and a particular religious community establishing a special 
regime in favour of the latter does not, in principle, contravene the 
 
 141. Id. at §§ 66–69. 
 142. Id. at §§ 91–92; see also Act of 20 May 1874 on the Legal Recognition of Religious 
Societies, RGBl. n. 68/1874, Sec. 2 [Austria], available at http://www.legirel.cnrs.fr/   
spip.php?article42; FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, RELIGIONS IN AUSTRIA 9 (Walter Reichel & 
Thomas Eder eds., Maria Bennett trans., 2011) available at https://www.bka.gv.at/ 
DocView.axd?CobId=37670. 
 143. Id. at § 92. 
 144. Savez Crkava, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 91–93. 
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requirements of Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention, provided that 
there is an objective and reasonable justification for the difference 
in treatment and that similar agreements may be entered into by 
other religious communities wishing to do so.145 
The court confirmed that “the State had a duty to remain neutral 
and impartial in exercising its regulatory power in the sphere of 
religious freedom and in its relations with different religions, 
denominations and beliefs.”146 
Beyond establishing different levels of legal recognition that 
allow each religion to choose the status it prefers and allow the state 
to take into account the historical and cultural significance of certain 
religions in the concerned country religious organizations in many 
European societies are considered useful, cultural auxiliaries that 
participate in the training of people in pluralistic democracies.147 
Across Europe, secularism does not necessarily mean a lack of 
cooperation between public authorities and religions, as the majority 
of the European countries that have implemented various religious 
recognition systems incorporate a number of public interest 
missions.148 In other words, religion does not appear in Europe as an 
effective foil against which the state and society should struggle for 
autonomy, but as a training vector and tool for the development of 
individuals that makes a useful contribution to the education of 
young people in learning their future responsibilities as citizens.149 
Far from any “religious political excommunication,”150 several 
European countries are developing public policies to integrate 
religion into the overall governance of the society, including in the 
field of education.151 
In Europe, religions are symbolic resources that can hardly be 
ignored by political leadership. In fact, in some European countries, 
starting with Germany, the defense of freedoms and the protection 
against the dangers of dictatorship and nationalism went hand in 
 
 145. Id. at § 85 (citations omitted). 
 146. Id. at § 88. 
 147. Moravcikova, supra note 92. 
 148. Levy & Razin, supra note 129. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Jean-Marc Ferry, THE LIGHTS OF RELIGION: INTERVIEW WITH ÉLODIE 
MAUROT [LES LUMIÈRES DE LA RELIGION: ENTRETIEN AVEC ÉLODIE MAUROT] 9–10 (2013). 
Ferry asserts that the exclusion of religious beliefs out of the public sphere is impoverishing for 
the citizen and democracy, a political excommunication of the religious. Id. 
 151. Levy & Razin, supra note 129. 
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hand with the consolidation of the institutional position of the 
churches and of their moral authority.152 While proclaiming that 
“there is no state church,” Jacques Zylberberg notes, the German 
State gives part of the public space to religious institutions arising 
from historical religious institutions.”153 Thus, the government 
recognizes religious institutions as political institutions participating 
in the common good. 
This model, which, far from reducing public action to only the 
actions of the state and local authorities, recognizes that religious 
groups can cooperate in public interest missions and help ensure and 
legitimize democracy, particularly through their educational 
endeavours that permeate both Western and Eastern Europe.154 
Ultimately, this type of secularism that dominates in Europe differs 
from the French secularism. European countries have eventually 
understood that the liberal state has indeed an interest in giving free 
reign to religious voices in the public, political sphere and that 
religious organizations are taking part in public life. As such, the 
state cannot discourage believers and religious communities from 
politically expressing themselves because it cannot know if in doing 
so, it might restrict the secular society from accessing important 
resources for the foundation of the society.155 
V. WHAT ABOUT FRANCE? 
While France puts off an appearance of a completely secular state 
in contrast to these other European countries, this Part will show 
that developments over time have led it to a recognition secularism. 
In France, the tradition of an emancipatory state exercising a 
kind of philosophical authority over the population has resulted in 
the belief that “true” freedom is only to be found in emancipation 
from religion.156 Thus, once a public recognition is manifest with 
 
 152. Jacques Zylberberg, Secularism Not Known: Germany, Canada, USA, UK [Laïcité, 
connais pas: Allemagne, Canada, États-Unis, Royaume-Uni], 75 POWERS [POUVOIRS] 37, 
39 (1995). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Levy & Razin, supra note 129. 
 155. Jürgen Habermas, ENTRE NATURALISME ET RELIGION: LES DÉFIS DE LA 
DÉMOCRATIE [BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION: THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRACY], 
190 (Christian Bouchindhomme & Alexandre Dupeyrix trans., 2008). 
 156. Jean-Paul Willaime, The Paradoxes of Laïcité in France, in THE CENTRALITY OF 
RELIGION IN SOCIAL LIFE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAMES A. BECKFORD 41, 45–49 (Eileen 
Barker ed., Allyn Hardyck trans., 2008). 
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regard to the religious, this quickly gives rise to negative reactions 
from those who confuse secularism and privatization of religious 
matter.157 President Jacques Chirac officially recognized the Masonic 
organizations in 2003 for the 275th anniversary of the foundation of 
the masonry.158 What would people have said if he had honoured 
religions in similar circumstances? Yet, the meeting between 
President Nicolas Sarkozy and Pope Benedict XVI at the Elysée 
Palace on September 12, 2008, was a fine example of a republican 
secularism of recognition and dialogue.159 
The status of secularism in France has also evolved over the past 
fifty years. Two indices are used to demonstrate the change. The first 
concerns the financing of church activities. The French Republic 
subsidizes the private education sector through contracts established 
by the Debré Act in 1959.160 Catholic schools were the first affected 
by this “school concordat,”161 but Jewish schools were also 
affected,162 and, since 2000, a few Muslim schools have felt the 
effects as well.163 It also applies to associations specifically dedicated 
to sporting, cultural, or social matters related to different faiths.164 
The religious activities themselves, which were particularly targeted 
by the prohibition of 1905, are now supported.165 Various measures 
of tax exemption have been adopted which allow religious 
associations to benefit from indirect subsidies.166 Various aids in 
 
 157. Id. at 47. 
 158. M. Jacques Chirac, President of France, Address on the Occasion of the 275th 
Anniversary of the Masonic Order in France (June 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.cesnur.org/2003/fr_chirac_1.htm. 
 159. Robert Marquand, With Pope’s Visit, Sarkozy Challenges French Secularism, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/   
layout/set/print/World/Europe/2008/0915/p01s01-woeu.html. 
 160. Frances C. Fowler, School Choice Policy in France: Success and Limitations, 6 EDUC. 
POL’Y 429, 429–30 (1992). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Zehavit Gross, Power, Identity, and Organizational Structure as Reflected in Schools 
for Minority Groups: A Case Study of Jewish Schools in Paris, Brussels, and Geneva, 50 COMP. 
EDUC. REV. 603 (2006). 
 163. Harry Judge, The Muslim Headscarf and French Schools, 111 AM. J. EDUC. 1, 
7 (2004). 
 164. Service Public Association [Public Service Association], Subventions versées aux 
associations [Grants to Associations], SERVICE-PUBLIC.FR (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.service-
public.fr/associations/vosdroits/F3180. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See BUREAU OF DEMOCARCY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: FRANCE (2014) 
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support of constructing places of worship were also added, in the 
form of provision of sites, loan guarantees, and even direct support, 
as in Rennes or Evry during the 1980s.167 The Council of State was 
petitioned to rule on the legality of such measures, and validated the 
principle of assembly in five judgments delivered on July 19, 2011.168 
The second indication concerns acceptance of religious 
affiliations as can be seen in the school environment. Though there 
is a ban on wearing “patent” religious signs,169 regulations now grant 
students the ability to obtain a leave of absence for religious 
obligations, and the benefit of chaplaincies, not only as provided for 
by the law of December 9, 1905 in boarding schools,170 but also in 
high school and college day schools. The introduction of teaching 
about religions in school curriculum since 1990-2000 also marks a 
qualitative leap.171 Built around the study of religious facts through 
existing disciplines without introducing either a special subject, or 
specific teaching staff,172 the French model indeed constitutes a 
unique model in Europe. The theme of “recognition” is central 
however: by specifying that religious knowledge is essential to the 
constitution of a “tolerant society,” the Department of Education 
rediscovers, away from the abstract concept of secularism, the 
importance of the religious factor in the construction of individual 
and collective identities. 
 
(“Although not tax-exempt, a cultural association may engage in profit-making activity and 
receive government subsidies for its cultural and educational operations.”) available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2014&dlid=238380. 
 167. Cf. Portier, supra note 27, at 102. 
 168. CE, Commune of Trélazé [Commune de Trélazé], 19 July 2011, n. 308544 (Fr.); 
CE, Federation of the free thinking and social action of the Rhône [Fédération de la libre 
pensée et de l’action sociale du Rhône], M.P., 19 July 2011, n. 308817 (Fr.); CE, Urban 
Community of Le Mans, Le Mans City [Communauté urbaine du Mans, Le Mans métropole], 
19 July 2011, n. 309161 (Fr.); CE, Commune of Montpellier [Commune de Montpellier], 19 
July 2011, n. 313518 (Fr.); CE, Mme V, 19 July 2011, n. 320796 (Fr.). 
 169. Code de l’éducation [Code Educ.] art. L141-5-1 (Fr.) (“In schools , colleges and 
public high schools , the wearing of signs or dress by which pupils overtly manifest a religious 




 170. Service Public Association, supra note 164. 
 171. Jean-Paul Willaime, Comparer l’incomparable [Comparing the Incomparable], in LE 
DÉFI DE L’ENSEIGNEMENT DES FAITS RELIGIEUX À L’ÉCOLE: RÉPONSES EUROPÉENNES ET 
QUÉBÉCOISES [THE CHALLENGE OF TEACHING RELIGIOUS FACTS IN SCHOOL: EUROPEAN 
AND QUÉBÉCOISES RESPONSES] 7, 17 (Jean-Paul Willaime ed., 2014). 
 172. Id. 
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Public authorities, both locally and centrally, are more and more 
willing to call on religious organizations to participate in various 
policy networks and in different forums for reflection where the 
collective standard is being developed. The institutionalization of the 
relationship between the government and the Roman Catholic 
Church in 2002,173 and the creation of the French Council of the 
Muslim faith in 2003,174 indicate, among other elements, this strong 
trend of French political life. Yet, after a year marked by difficult 
relations with major denominations (due to the passage of the law 
opening marriage to same-sex couples), President François Hollande 
himself, initially reluctant and counter to his predecessor, granted a 
public dimension for the religious and justified the practice of 
cooperation with holy orders during the ceremony of the vows with 
religious authorities in January, 2014.175 President Hollande stated: 
I want to address you with this message, over and beyond my vows: 
we can expect much from this dialogue between the State and 
religions. We also feel that there is a need for spirituality in our 
country. We cannot merely reduce the material considerations, even if 
they are essential. Because there is a crisis, there is also the need to 
have a conscience, to understand the meaning and contribute to it.”176 
Even in France then, behind the official neutrality of abstention 
and non-recognition of religious groups, a certain form of 
recognition-secularity is actually practiced.177 Therefore, we can say 
that in terms of state-religion relations, France is less singular and 
more European than has been imagined. While maintaining 
forbearance and neutrality rhetoric, ministries of the Republic 
maintain regular contact with qualified representatives of different 
religions, representatives who are also received at the Elysée at the 
traditional New Year reception of vows.178 The establishment, in 
2002, of an annual meeting between the government and the 
 
 173. U.S. STATE DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: 
FRANCE (2005). 
 174. Id. 
 175. President Hollande Vows to Clamp Down on Religious Intolerance, FRANCE IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM (Jan 7, 2014), ambafrance-uk.org/President-Hollande-vows-to-clamp. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Willaime, supra note 41, at 67−82. 
 178. France’s President Sarkozy delivers New Year address to religious representatives at the 
Elysee Palace in Paris, TOWNHALL.COM (Jan. 7, 2011), http://townhall.com/photos/ 
2011/01/07/frances_president_sarkozy_delivers_new_year_address_to_religious_representati
ves_at_the_elysee_palace_in_paris. 
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Catholic Church179 as well as the creation in 2003 of the French 
Council of the Muslim faith180 testify, alongside other events, of a 
regular practice of dialogue and consultation between public 
authorities and religious authorities.181 
The consideration of religious dimensions by the Ministry of 
Foreign and European Affairs’ Analysis and Prospective Center182 
shows that French diplomacy, just like American diplomacy,183 
understands that religious facts cannot be ignored in the context of 
international relations. Laurent Fabius, current Minister at the 
French Foreign Ministry, explained recently at a symposium that a 
number of current international crises remain unintelligible and 
beyond insoluble when the religious factor is not taken into account. 
The analysis of developments in religious matters is an important 
tool in understanding the world. Religion, because it influences 
individual and collective behaviour, changes our mission of 
knowledge of realities, or of knowledge of the field. The attention 
we must pay it encompasses a wide variety of problems: balance 
within states, bilateral relations, transnational issues, security issues, 
international standards, and challenges of development.184 He 
concluded that religion can and must be a cultural factor of dialogue 
and peace. In this area, France has a valuable experience to assert 
without arrogance. It endeavours and will endeavour to do so.185 
All these findings contradict a secularist perception of French 
secularism that ignores the religious dimensions and conveys a 
unilaterally negative approach to them. It is true that discrepancies 
between the speech of secularism and the practices to which they 
 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Eglise Catholique en France [Catholic Church in France], 10ème rencontre de 
l’Instance Matignon [10th meeting of the Matignon Forum], EGLISE.CATHOLIQUE.FR (Sept. 
12, 2014), http://www.eglise.catholique.fr/Actualites/382316-10eme-rencontre-linstance-
matignon/. 
 182. Corine Lesnes, Justin Vaïsse, le stratège du Quai d’Orsay [Justin Vaïsse, Foreign 
Ministry Strategist], LE MONDE GIO ET POLITIQUE [THE WORLD AND POLICY] (Feb. 22, 
2013), http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/02/22/le-stratege-du-quai-d-
orsay_1837320_3210.html. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Laurent Fabius, Religions et politique étrangère [Religion and Foreign Policy], in LA 
DIPLOMATIE AU DÉFI DES RELIGIONS. TENSIONS, GUERRES, MÉDIATIONS [DIPLOMACY 
CHALLENGE OF RELIGIONS, TENSIONS, WARS, MEDIATIONS] 13 (Denis Lacorne, Justin Vaïsse 
& Jean-Paul Willaime eds., 2014). 
 185. Id. at 21. 
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give rise are particularly clear in France. Throughout Europe, what is 
especially notable are various forms of recognition secularism which 
combine mutual independence of the state and religion with an 
explicit inclusion of religion’s place and role in society. After 
opposing the denominational model that prevailed in countries 
having a Protestant or Orthodox culture186 and the separation 
models which prevailed in the predominantly Catholic countries of 
Europe,187 Philippe Portier describes a crossover movement where 
denominational states have opened themselves to a separative logic, 
separatist states to a partnership logic. Hence, we have seen, on a 
European level, the emergence of a shared model of secularism while 
meeting the criteria of both equality and recognition of 
memberships, specific to a flexible separation scheme.188 This is 
indeed a system of separation-recognition prevailing in Europe. In 
other words, a regime which, while based on the respective 
autonomy of states and religions, explicitly recognizes the place and 
role of religious groups by granting them a specific legal framework 
within which to function. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This implementation of the social recognition of religions in 
many secular countries of Europe is also reflected on the same scale 
in the European Union itself. The Lisbon Treaty Preamble states 
that it “dr[ew] inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal 
values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, 
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.”189 In adopting 
this, the European Union asserts that, among the diverse heritage 
that inspire it, there are also religious heritages. The wording, by 
asserting that it is from this heritage that the universal values 
cherished by Europe have developed, goes further in recognizing 
that religious heritages, among others, have also contributed to the 
development of these values. The Preamble thus clearly differs from 
the Preamble of the Charter of European Union Fundamental 
 
 186. Portier, supra note 27. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 98. 
 189. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Preamble, Dec. 13, 2007, 2702 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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Rights,190 which had been controversial, particularly in France, 
because of the reference to the religious heritage of Europe. Not 
only are religious heritages explicitly mentioned in the Lisbon treaty, 
but by using the phrase “drawing inspiration from” in the treaty to 
replace the word “conscious” in the Preamble to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the Lisbon Treaty recognizes that religious 
heritages are also legacies that alongside others have promulgated 
the democratic values upon which European states and the European 
Union itself are based. This is official recognition in a secular and 
non-secular pluralistic spirit, of the role of religions in the formation 
of a democratic Europe. 
A second element of the Lisbon Treaty recognizes the presence 
of religions in the public space and explicitly agrees to take into 
account their various contributions to community life without 
sacrificing the independence of the state and public authorities with 
regard to any religion or philosophies. The Treaty states 
the following: 
1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under 
national law of churches and religious associations or 
communities in the Member States. 
2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of 
philosophical and non-confessional organisations [sic]. 
3. Recognising [sic] their identity and their specific contribution, 
the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular 
dialogue with these churches and organisations [sic].191 
In other words, while clearly asserting that the state-religion 
relationships are derived from national law and not from community 
law, the Treaty declares that the national mechanisms built into its 
twenty-eight state-members will be respected, and the European 
Union explicitly recognizes the identity and specific contribution of 
religious and philosophical groups (atheistic humanisms) and wishes 
to maintain an “open, transparent and regular” dialogue with 
them.192 In doing so, the European Union, as are Member States, 
establishes that it is not secularist, but secular. 
 
 190. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 1. 
 191. Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, 
2012 O.J. (C 326) 49, art. 17. 
 192. Id. 
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Beyond the diversity of Church-State relationships in the various 
European countries, there is a trend towards a secular recognition of 
religions. This trend combines mutual independence of the state and 
religion with an explicit consideration of the role of religion within 
society. The European Union and its Member states are secular and 
no religion determines the politics of the States or of the E.U. As 
Ronan McCrea argues: “The approaches of Member States to 
religion are characterized by Europe’s common heritage of 
Christianity and by humanist and secular influences that have 
emerged from European history and have limited religious influence 
over law and politics in Europe to a greater degree than 
elsewhere.”193 Secularism is thus an important part of the European 
identity. But this fundamental secularism does not prevent taking 
into account religions’ contributions to society. This idea is why I 
speak of a secularism of recognition: a secularism that involves a 
practice of regular dialogues between public authorities and 




 193. RONAN MCCREA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
16 (2010). 
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